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1 Introduction
Providing effective aid has long been a major concern among econo-
mists and policy makers. In order to achieve Millennium Development
Goals, aid donor countries and multilateral development banks shifted
their focus on poverty alleviation, which lead to the belief that aids in the
form of outright grants rather than loans are more preferable.１）After
active debates,２）the actual patterns of aid disinbursement show that the
donor countries and the multilateral development banks in fact switched
from loans to grants. Japan, providing the highest proportion of bilateral
loans to the total bilateral ODA among the DAC countries, has reduced
the proportion of bilateral loans since 2000.３）
The drastic change in the forms of aid is a consequence of less than
satisfactory performance of aid in promoting sustainable growth in the
aid-recipient countries, creating highly debt-indebted countries and
sluggish improvement in poverty reduction. Among numerous studies
estimating the effectiveness of aid on growth, an influential paper by
Burnside and Dollar (2000) showed the importance of good policy
environment for aid to be effective. The evidence shows that although the
direct effect of aid on growth is not that significant, aid does promote




growth if the recipient country has a sound policy environments, while aid
is dissipated under a distorted policy environment. For policy makers, aid
effectiveness is far from satisfactory, and resulted in the redirection of aid
policies toward reducing poverty in the 1990’s.４） The primary goal of
providing aid was thus replaced by poverty alleviation, and pro-poor aid
policies were encouraged. Aid transfers are not given in the form of
unilateral lump-sum transfers, but rather they are tied in the sense that
they are associated with a specific policy objective of poverty alleviation.
This paper is motivated to analyze the effects of poverty targeted tied aids
on recipients’ economic growth.
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of aid on growth suggest mixed
results. Kokumin Keizai Research Institute (2000) showed that loan aid
have stronger growth effects by examining 100 countries’ panel data; 1
percent increase in Japanese loan aid/GDP share stimulates the recipient’s
growth rate by 0.23 percentage points, while grant aid did not have
statistically significant growth effects. Kohama, Sawada and Kono (2003)
found that loan aids have stronger growth effects in the long run com-
pared to grants, irrespective of the good policy environment, thus rejecting
the Burnside-Dollar argument. Cordella and Ulku (2004), on the other
hand, supports the Burnside-Dollar argument by using a different frame-
work controlling for the total amount of aid being granted. They found
instead that grant aids are conducive to economic growth if countries are
poor, having bad policy environments, and high debt obligations.
Despite active policy debates on the effectiveness of aid on growth,
theoretical works have not caught up with them. Only a few paid attention
to the effects of tied aid on economic growth in a dynamic framework,
but certainly have brought new insights to the discussion of the effective-
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ness of tied aid５）by examining the effects of aid on productivity, capital
accumulation and terms of trade.
Chao and Yu (2001) considered aid tied to the purchase of an im-
ported capital good subject to import quota, and showed the possibility of
the paradoxical effects of tied aid on capital accumulation; aid tied to the
imports of capital goods may reduce the level of capital stock, which
leads to welfare deterioration. The negative effects of tied aid on capital
accumulation are also identified in a growing economy with learning by
doing. Chi-Chur Chao et al. (2007) constructed a two-country growth
model with learning by doing, hence focusing on the effects of endoge-
nously determined international output prices on capital accumulation, and
simulated the welfare effects of aids tied to the purchase of quota-
restricted imports. The effects of tied aid on productivity is explicitly
characterized by Benarroch and Gaisford (2004) in a dynamic Ricardian
model with learning by doing. Aid tied to technological transfer from the
North to the South expedites the process of product cycle in the South
through adoption of new technology and learning, and were shown to be
welfare improving for both donors and recipients.
The purpose of the paper is to construct a simple two-sector dynamic
model with learning-by-doing and characterize growth-promoting and
welfare-enhancing aid policies. We depart from the previous literature by
considering two new forms of tying, grant aid and loan aid. In particular,
humanitarian grant aid (characterized as capital transfer to production) and loan
aid to manufacturing sector will be shown to have distinct effects on
growth, which may provide some insights on the ongoing policy debate
regarding the forms of aid. The question is not whether aid should be
aimed at reducing poverty or promoting growth, nor should aid be given
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in the form of grants rather than loans. The paper is motivated to
characterize the forms of aid that can promote economic growth in a small
open economy. The trading patterns and the access to international capital
markets are shown to be important factors in determining the welfare
effects of tied aid.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the following section,
a two-sector model with a basic commodity (say food) produced under
constant returns to scale and manufactured goods produced under increas-
ing returns to scale with learning-by-doing is presented. As a benchmark
analysis, effects of un-tied aid are also analyzed. Section 3 turns to the
welfare analysis of tied aid in the form of grants and loans. In particular,
the aid tied to food production and manufactured good productions are
going to be analyzed. Related literature is discussed in Section 4, and the
final section concludes with some remarks.
2 A Model
In this section, I present a model of a small open economy that
consists of two sectors producing a manufactured good and an agricultural
good, denoted by m and a respectively. Technology available to this
economy is assumed to be time invariant and is given by:
Xm (t ) M (t )Fm (Lm (t ) Km (t )) M (t )Lm (t ) fm (km (t )) (1)
Xa (t ) Fa (La (t ) Ka (t )) La (t ) fa (Ka (t )) (2)
where Xi (t ) denotes the output levels of sector i at time t, Li (t ) the
amount of labor allocated to sector i at time t (i = m , a), Ki the exoge-
nously given amount of capital specific to each sector at time t, and ki (t )
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the capital-labor ratio in sector i at time t. Production function, Fi is
assumed to be continuously differentiable and exhibits constant returns to
scale technology with diminishing marginal productivity to each factors of
production, which gives us the intensive form production function fi ,
fi (ki (t )) 0, fi (ki (t ))0. The learning-by-doing in the manufacturing
sector is modeled a la Matsuyama (1992). M (t ) indicates the pre-
determined level of productivity in manufacturing sector at time t. M (t )
can be thought as knowledge capital in manufacturing sector, which
accumulates over time through learning-by-doing;６）
M˙ (t )
M (t )Xm (t ) 0 (3)
where a dot notation denotes the time derivative. The learning-by-doing
effects are assumed to never depreciate and are purely external to firms.
Exogenously given amounts of capital are available and are used
specifically for the production of manufactured and agricultural goods.
Labor, on the other hand, is assumed to be mobile between two sectors.a (t )m(t )1, i (t )ki (t )i (t ) (4)
where i (t )Li (t ) denotes the fraction of labor allocated to sector i, andi (t )Ki (t ) is the capital-labor endowment ratio. The amount of labor
supplied,  , is given exogenously and assumed to be constant over time.
The marginal productivity pricing rule applies under perfect competi-
tion; (t )pm(t )M (t ) fm (km (t ))fm (km (t ))km (t )   (5)pa (t ) fa (ka (t ))fa (ka (t ) ka (t )  
Rm (t )pm(t ) fm (km (t ))Ra (t )pa (t ) fa (ka (t )) (6)
 
 
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where pi (t ) are the international prices of output i.
We define per-capita income as  a pa (t ) fa (ka (t )  mpm(t ) Mt
fm (km (t )). Assuming no factor accumulation, (t ) grows at a rate˙(t )(t )mfm (km (t )) (7)
where m pm (t )M (t )fm (km (t ))(t ) is the output share of manufactured good. (7)
indicates that the growth rate of the per-capita income depends on the
relative size of the manufactured-good sector and not on the agricultural
sector.７）
2.1 Growth Rate
To see how the economy evolves over time, (5) is differentiated with
respect to time, using (4) and suppressing time notations to obtain
(a ka a  m km m) ˙ m Xm  p˙ apa p˙ mpm   m m ˙ma a ˙a (8)
where i  fikifi fiki 0. By interpreting the signs of each terms, the fol-
lowing result is in order.
Claim 1 An economy grows faster if
１） the output of manufactured goods expands.
２） the relative international price of manufactured goods increases.
３） the capital endowment in manufacturing sector increases.
４） the capital endowment in agriculture sector decreases.
The dynamics of economic growth reveal a knife-edge property of
the model. Once an economy achieves higher economic growth rate, the
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productivity in the manufacturing sector grows faster through learning-by-
doing, and the economic growth further accelerates. On the other hand, if
economic growth rate slows down, it has perpetual effects on learning-by-
doing, and the economy slows down even further. To better understand
the movement of the growth rate, the output level of manufactured goods
are examined in the following subsection.
2.2 Instantaneous Equilibrium
In a perfectly competitive market, cost minimization implies the input
requirement for each factor, j  L K to be written as a function of
factor prices and the level of knowledge capital; ajm( Ri M (t )) and
aja( Ri). By interpreting experience as the cumulative manufactured
output, the learning-by-doing improves productivity in the following way.
aKm  LmLm(ˆ(t )pˆ m(t ))bMˆ (t ) (9)
aLm  KmLm(ˆ(t )pˆ m(t ))bMˆ (t ) (10)
where b is the proportionate reduction in factor input requirement due to
learning-by-doing, and the hat notations indicate the rate of change in
that variable. It is assumed that the learning-by-doing effect does not alter
the capital-labor ratio at constant factor prices; thus the factor input
requirement is reduced by the same proportion for each factor.
By defining the elasticity of marginal product of labor, à la Jones,Li  (aˆ Liaˆ Ki )(t )pˆ i (t ) and after some calculation,８）ˆ(t ) mpˆ m(t )a pˆ a (t )m(t )Kˆ m(t )a (t )Kˆ a (t ) (11)
where i i (t )Li m(t )Lma (t )La the weighted average of theˆ
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elasticity of marginal productivity.
By substituting (11), we can now present the following expression for
the supply function of manufactured goods.
Xˆ m(t ) Kˆ m(t )aˆ Km  Kˆ m(t )  LmLm(ˆ(t )pˆ m(t ))bMˆ (t )    LmLmm(pˆ m(t )pˆ a (t ))(1 LmLmm(t ))Kˆ m(t ) LmLma (t )Kˆ a (t )bMˆ (t ) (12)
We can now present the following.
Claim 2 Manufacturing sector expands, and consequently, an economy
grows faster, if
１） the relative price of manufactured goods increases.
２）Km increases if the elasticity of labor demand in the manufacture sec-
tor is less than one,  LmLm 1 .
３）Ka decreases.
2.3 Consumer’s Problem
The representative consumer in the recipient country is allowed to
freely lend and borrow from the international capital market at the world





U (Ca (t )Cm (t )etdt (13)
stCa (t )p (t )Cm (t )A˙ (t ) Y (t )rA (t )t (14)
A (0) A0lim
tA (t )et  0 (15)
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where A (t ) is the beginning of the period holdings of one-period bonds
(worth a claim to one unit output). U ( ) is the instantaneous utility function,  
the rate of time preference. Letting an agricultural good be the numeraire
and denoting the relative international price of manufactured good as p (t ).




E (t )ertdt A0 Y0Y0  
0

Y (t )ertdt (16)
E (t )Ca (t )p (t )Cm (t ) (17)
By setting up a Hamiltonian, we obtain the following necessary and
sufficient conditions:
U˙ 
U r limta (t )U( )e t 0 (18)
Assuming the log linear utility function U (Ca (t )Cm (t ))ln Ca (t )
ln Cm (t )(17) becomes
C˙i (t )
Ci (t )
r   Ci (t )Ci 0 e (r )t (19)
By using the intertemporal budget constraint (15), consumption can be
written as a linear function of wealth, i.e., the net discounted sum of lend-
ing and output values.
Ca0 1 (A0 Y0 ) Cm0 1(1) (0) (A0 Y0 ) (20)
The indirect utility function, (t ) can be written as
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 (t ) ln 1(A0 Y0 )  et ln 1(1)p (0) (A0 Y0 )et (1) ln(A0 Y0 )et Det (21)
where D  ln 1p (t )ln ( 1)ln ( 11) is a constant term capturing the
effects of the changes in the relative prices. In the presence of perfect
international capital market, an economy can freely lend and borrow at the
constant world interest rate i, hence i  , in equilibrium. The intertem-








As a benchmark for later analysis, we define W0 such that A0  0;




We are now ready to proceed with the welfare analysis of aid policies.
3 Welfare Analysis of Tied Aids
3.1 Grant Aids
Suppose aid is granted in the form of capital in the initial period. The
amount of capital transferred is Gi 0; Ki 0 Ki (0)Gio . Let YGio 
0

Y (t ; Gio )ertdt be the discounted output values with capital transfer to
sector i in the initial period. Then, from (7), (12) and (22), YGmo Y0 ,
YGao Y0 . The welfare level with grant aids in the presence of a perfect
capital market is given by,
W Gio  (1)1 ln(YGio )0D etdt (24)




Proposition 1 （１） In the absence of population growth, grant aid to
agricultural sector in the form of capital transfer is immiserizing and
slows down the economic growth.
（２） In the absence of population growth, grant aid to manufacturing
sector in the form of capital transfer improves intertemporal welfare and
promotes economic growth if the elasticity of labor demand in the manu-
facture sector is less than one,  LmLm 1 .
In order to alleviate poverty, providing food aid appears to be a
obvious solution. However, many economists casted doubts on the effec-
tiveness of food aid in a static analysis with various forms of distortions.９）
The above result verifies that grant aid for food production deteriorates
intertemporal welfare in presence of dynamic learning-by-doing in manu-
facturing sector. Capital transfer to the agricultural sector stimulates food
production, which in turn diverts resources away from the manufacturing
sector exhibiting increasing returns to scale, generating the negative
effects on economic growth.
3.2 Loan Aid
Suppose instead that aid is provided in the form of loans. The
recipient government receives aid in the form of capital, which is to be
repaid to the foreign donors at the world interest rate. Let foreign debt be
denoted by B (t ). Assuming the government budget to be balanced at
every moment, the flow budget constraint for the government is
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Gio  rB (t )B˙ (t ) (25)
The foreign borrowing is equal to the loan−aid transfer and the interest
payments. By integrating, we obtain the following intertemporal govern-
ment budget constraint.
Gio B (0)  B (0)B0  lim
tB (t )et 0 (26)
In the presence of foreign debt, the flow and intertemporal budget
constraint of the representative consumer becomes, noting the fact that
A (t )B (t ) for all t,
Ca (t ) p (t )Cm (t ) rB (t )Y (t ) B˙ (t ) t (27)
Combined with an assumption that the foreign debt grows at a rate less




E (t )ertdt B0  YGio (28)
The present value of consumption is equal to the discounted value of
GDP, YGio , plus the initial foreign debt, .B0 .
Intertemporal welfare level is, by using (21),
WGio (1 )1 ln 0(B0  YGio )etdt   0D etdt (29)
Welfare effects of loan aids, thus, depend on the term (B0  YGio ).
Clearly, WGio W Gio ; the grant aids in the presence of international
capital markets yield higher intertemporal welfare than the loan aids.




form of capital transfer yield higher intertemporal welfare compared to
loan aids.
Let us introduce another reference point where there exists no inter-
national capital markets. If no international lending and borrowing are










By comparing WGio with respect to WGio

WGio WGio  (1 )[1 ln 0(B0 YGio )etdt  0 ln YGio etdt ]  (1 )[1 ln1ln 
0

(B0 YGio )etdt  0 ln YGio etdt ]
(31)
As  1, (1 ln) 0, and hence WGio W Gio . On the other hand, as 0，the first and second terms in the square bracket goes to infinity,
and WGio W Gio : For a sufficiently small , loan aid yields higher
intertemporal welfare than grant aid without international capital market;
WGio W Gio .
Proposition 3 When international capital markets do not exist, for a
sufficiently small discount rate, loan aid in the form of capital transfer
yields higher intertemporal welfare compared to grant aid.
Aid in the forms of grants and loans, both provide additional income
for current consumption as well as future consumption through accelerated
economic growth. Loan aid, however, provides additional source of


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intertemporal welfare gains through consumption smoothing. With suffi-
ciently small discount rates, future consumption is highly valued, hence,
the welfare gains through consumption smoothing is greater even if loans
are to be repaid. The intertemporal welfare level with loan aid, thus, can
exceed that of grant aid.
4 Related Literature
Compared to the literature on the welfare effects of un-tied transfer,
the literature on tied aid is rather small but growing. Studies on tied aid
inherits the discussion for un-tied lump-sump aid transfers by focusing on
the conflict of interest between donors and recipients. Tying of aid was
considered to be aiming at either promoting donor’s interest in exporting,
alleviating poverty or sustaining balance of payments for recipient’s by
imposing restrictions on imports.
The possibilities of transfer paradox were analyzed for various forms
of tied-aids. Aids tied to private consumption of imports were analyzed by
Brecher and Bhagwati (1982), Kemp and Kojima (1985), Schweinberger
(1990), and more recently by Abe and Takarada (2005). Tying of aid to
specific expenditure patterns can in principle create transfer paradoxes in
a stable equilibrium in a two country model, because it induces the
changes in the terms of trade caused by what Schweinberger (1990) calls it
‘endogenous’ quantity restrictions, and thus leads to transfer paradoxes.
Another strand of literature on tied aid relates to distortions. Primary
concern for tying of aids was to improve recipients’ welfare. Studies show
that in the presence of distortions, tying of aids may magnify distortions
and lead to paradoxical welfare effects in a small country. Various forms
of distortions, such as tariffs and import quota, increasing returns to scale
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technologies and externalities are considered. In the presence of trade
policies, tying of aids to imports may immizerize the recipient. Ohyama
(1974) pointed out the possibility of transfer paradoxes of aid tied to
imports in the presence of tariffs, and Lahiri and Raimondos (1995) in the
presence of import quota. Lahiri and Raimondos (1997), in turn, showed
that aids tied to reducing import tariffs in the recipient country can be
welfare improving. Welfare effects of tied−aid on capital accumulation are
analyzed in the presence of import quotas by Chao and Yu (2001), in
which aids are tied to imported capital goods.
Production and other factor market distortions are also discussed
in the literature. Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) demonstrated that in the
presence of exogenous production distortions, tied-aid that shifts an
economy away from the efficient allocation may be immizerizing in a
stable equilibrium for a small open economy. Aids tied to nontraded
goods (Yano and Nugent (1999) and Choi (2004)), public consumption goods,
(Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1993), Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1996),
Schweinberger (2002)) and public inputs (Takarada (2000), Yamashige (2001))
can also be immiserizing in a small open economy. In the presence of
urban unemployment of the Harrris-Todaro type in the recipient country,
tied aid in the form of capital transfer to import sectors are shown to be
welfare immizerizing in a small open economy by Khan (1982), Marjit and
Beladi (2003) and by Michael (1998) in a two country model. Brakman and
Marrewijk (1995) analyzes the effects of tied-aid in an economy with dif-
ferentiated goods produced under monopolistically competitive markets.
Depending on the source of distortions, tied-aid that intensifies
distortions may have adverse welfare effects on the recipients. Dynamic
analysis of tied aid in Chi-Chur Chao et al. (2007), Benarroch and
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Gaisford (2004) as well as this paper all highlight the effect of learning-by-
doing, which generate externality. They can be thought of as an extension
of the static analysis of tied aid in a distortion driven economy to a
intertemporal framework.
Tying of aid takes the form of not just restricting how transfer re-
sources are utilized, but also imposing conditions on recipients’ economic
policies. Donors may tie aids (or impose conditionality) to imposing restric-
tions on trade policies and/or industrial policies to promote economic
performance of the recipient countries. Svensson (2000) points out the
moral hazard problem regarding the recipient government’s incentives in
reducing poverty and tied aid can serve as commitments by donors and
thus improve the effectiveness of aids. In Adam and O’Connell (2004),
aids are tied to trade liberalization by donors, and discussed the substitut-
ability between offering aid and trade.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the growth effects of grant aid and loan aid were
analyzed in a small open economy with learning by doing. It has been
shown that pro-poor transfers may have negative impact on growth; grant-
ing productive factor to agricultural sector slows down the growth rate
and reduce intertemporal welfare. Capital transfers to the manufacturing
sector stimulate learning by doing and accelerate growth. Furthermore,
loan aid to manufacturing sector with international lending and borrowing
leads to higher intertemporal welfare compared to grant aid without an
access to international capital markets.
The results do not suggest for eliminating food production aid nor
encourage capital transfers to manufacturing sectors to give a big-push to
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industrialization. What we identified in the paper is that the existence of
international trade and international capital markets matter in determining
the effectiveness of aids tied to specific sectors both in the form of grants
and loans. If no international lending and borrowing are allowed for the
recipient country, loan aid can have more significant effects on growth
relative to humanitarian grant aid.
The advocates of food aid stand on the common presumption that
agriculture plays an active role in the course of industrialization; an
improvement in agricultural productivity, many argue, is a prerequisite for
industrialization. However, there is an alternative view presented by
Gerschenkron (1967): “The more backward a country, the less likely was
its agriculture to play any active role by offering to the growing industries
the advantges of an expanding industrial market based in turn on the
rising productivity of agricultural labor.”１０） This paper, along with
Matsuyama (1992), Ishikawa (1992) focused on the effects of dynamic
learning by doing in the manufacturing sector, characterized the passive
role of agriculture in industrialization. The question is not whether or not
progress in agricultural productivity is a prerequisite for industrialization,
but rather, as Gerschenkron carefully puts it, “industrialization may be
classified as proceeding in conditions of progress in agriculture or of
stagnation, if not retrogression”.１１） So should the effective forms of aid
policies.
Footnote
１） See Meltzer Commission (2000) and Paris Declaration.
２） See, for example, Bulow and Rogoff (2005).
３） For the discussion of Japan’s ODA policies see Ishikawa (2006).
４） See, for example, the report by DAC committee Meltzer Commission (2000).
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５） In Kemp and Kojima (1985) aids are said to be “tied in the recipient if it is
spent inefficiently in terms of individual preferences and that aid is tied in the
donor if it is financed inefficiently.” See Brakman and Marrewijk (1998) for a
comprehensive survey on both non-tied and tied aids.
６） Learning is enhanced by cumulative output, not by cumulative investment as
in Chi-Chur Chao et al. (2007). See Solow (1997) for insightful discussions on
the formalization of learning-by-doing in a growth model and the relationship
with the endogenous growth model.
７） The model exhibits unbounded growth due to learning-by-doing in manufac-
turing sector. Such characterization may not be unrealistic, however, it allows
us to qualitatively analyze the effects of aid on growth.
８） We use the material balance equations, aLmaKm Km (t ) aLaaKa Ka (t ) , which
can be rewritten as, by using the input requirement function; m(t )(aˆ Lm aˆ KmKˆ m(t ))  a (t )(aˆ La aˆ KaKˆ a (t ))0
９） See, for example, Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Lahiri and Raimondos
(1996).
１０） Gerschenkron (1967, p. 354)
１１） Gerschenkron (1968, p. 80)
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